Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption

Sergey Anokhin and William S. Schulze

Journal of Business Venturing, 2009, vol. 24, issue 5, pages 465-476

Abstract: Efforts to control corruption increase levels of trust in the ability of the state and market institutions to reliably and impartially enforce law and the rules of trade. Such trust facilitates the development of arms-length trade and the coordination of complex economic activities. We posit that better control of corruption will also be associated with rising levels of innovation and entrepreneurship. Absent such trust, however, monitoring and other transactions cost should restrict the scale and scope of trade and thus, hamper productivity and investment in innovation and entrepreneurship. Longitudinal data from 64 nations lends support to our propositions, thus helping unpack the puzzling relationship between entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Innovation; Control; of; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:24:y:2009:i:5:p:465-476

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