Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence

Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Yegor Grygorenko

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008, vol. 36, issue 1, pages 17-42

Abstract: This paper develops a partial equilibrium model to account for stylized facts about the behavior of oligarchs, politically and economically strong conglomerates, in transition and developing countries. The model predicts that oligarchs are more likely than other owners to invest in productivity enhancing projects and to vertically integrate firms to capture the gains from possible synergies and, thus, oligarchs can be productive. Using a unique data set comprising almost 2000 Ukrainian open joint stock companies, the paper tests empirical implications of the model. In contrast to commonly held views, econometric results suggest that, after controlling for endogeneity of ownership, oligarchs can improve the performance of the firms they own relative to other firms. Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (1) (2008) 17-42.

Date: 2008

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WHV ... d8ed93e3ef55b58b6633
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Are Oligarchs Productive? Theory and Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Are Oligarchs Productive? Theory and Evidence (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:36:y:2008:i:1:p:17-42

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Comparative Economics is edited by D. Berkowitz and G. Roland

More articles in Journal of Comparative Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().