Pre-commitment and personality: Behavioral explanations in ultimatum games

Pamela Schmitt (), Robert Shupp, Kurtis Swope and Justin Mayer

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, vol. 66, issue 3-4, pages 597-605

Abstract: In a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment, responder behavior is more consistent with game-theoretic predictions when responders indicate a binding minimum acceptable offer (MAO) or when rejection penalizes a "hostage" third player. In general, female subjects indicated higher MAOs but had a much greater reaction than males to the presence of a third player. Offers increase in the presence of a binding MAO but are not affected by a third player. Behavior in our experiment is also generally consistent with hypotheses based on a popular personality test instrument.

Date: 2008

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