Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009, vol. 71, issue 2, pages 486-494

Abstract: In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.

Keywords: Hold-up; Relationship-specific; investments; Fairness; Reciprocity; Asymmetric; information; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:2:p:486-494

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