Exchange, theft, and the social formation of property

Erik Olson Kimbrough, Vernon L. Smith and Bart J. Wilson ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2010, vol. 74, issue 3, pages 206-229

Abstract: We design a laboratory experiment to explore whether and how property endogenously arises in a specialization and exchange environment where "theft" is costless. Additional treatments make available optional private protection mechanisms. We find that although an absence of exogenous enforcement does not hamper property's emergence in all cases, the private options tend to worsen outcomes on average. Property emerges when subjects self-organize groups, understand potential gains from trade, convince group members that all benefit by avoiding theft, and display credible commitment to cooperation in their actions. In other words, as Hume argued in 1740, property is a convention.

Keywords: Property; rights; Specialization; Exchange; Experimental; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F ... ce3d1cf180e3f2a04083
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:74:y:2010:i:3:p:206-229

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is edited by J. B. Rosser

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Wendy Shamier ().