Refunds and collusion in service industries

Staffan Ringbom and Oz Shy ()

Journal of Economics and Business, 2008, vol. 60, issue 6, pages 502-516

Abstract: This paper investigates industry-wide agreements on joint refund policies, and how they influence price competition. We compute the profit of fully-colluding, competing, and semicolluding service providers who offer refunds to those consumers who do not show up at the time of service. Our main findings are that both a monopoly serving all consumer types, and semicollusive service providers offer full refunds. In contrast, competing service providers offer only partial refunds. Finally, refund policies are investigated under moral hazard behavior.

Keywords: Refunds; Partial; refunds; Collusion; on; refunds; Moral; hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:60:y:2008:i:6:p:502-516

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