Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players

John List () and Charles F. Mason

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2001, vol. 42, issue 3, pages 277-296

Date: 2001
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