Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2013

Edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

from Elsevier
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Volume 133, issue 1, 2007

Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance pp. 1-30

Hitoshi Matsushima

What to maximize if you must pp. 31-57

Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon and Yossi Spiegel

Dynamic signaling and market breakdown pp. 58-82

Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz

The formation of networks with transfers among players pp. 83-110

Francis Bloch and Matthew O. Jackson

Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization pp. 111-126

Hannu Vartiainen

Democratic public good provision pp. 127-151

John Hassler, Kjetil Storesletten and Fabrizio Zilibotti

Optimal risk sharing with background risk pp. 152-176

Rose-Anne Dana and Marco Scarsini

Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games pp. 177-198

Teck Hua Ho, Colin F. Camerer and Juin-Kuan Chong

The effects of market structure on industry growth: Rivalrous non-excludable capital pp. 199-218

Christos Koulovatianos and Leonard Jay Mirman

Exploitable actions of believers in the "law of small numbers" in repeated constant-sum games pp. 219-235

Steven Scroggin

Subjective probabilities on "small" domains pp. 236-265

Igor Kopylov

Attention economies pp. 266-294

Josef Falkinger

On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria pp. 295-315

Dieter Balkenborg and Karl H. Schlag

A subjective model of experimentation pp. 316-330

Kazuya Hyogo

Core tatonnement pp. 331-349

Mihai Manea

Utilitarianism for infinite utility streams: A new welfare criterion and its axiomatic characterization pp. 350-373

Kaushik Basu and Tapan Mitra

Bidder collusion pp. 374-402

Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx

Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice pp. 403-440

Abel Cadenillas, Jaksa Cvitanic and Fernando Zapatero

A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments pp. 441-466

John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey

The possibility of informationally efficient markets pp. 467-483

Marc-Andreas Muendler

The timing of contracting with externalities pp. 484-503

Marc Möller

Decentralized learning from failure pp. 504-523

Andreas Blume and April Franco

Pairwise trade and coexistence of money and higher-return assets pp. 524-535

Tao Zhu and Neil Wallace

Network formation and stable equilibrium pp. 536-549

Chongmin Kim and Kam-Chau Wong

Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions pp. 550-567

Drew Fudenberg, Markus Michael Mobius and Adam Szeidl

Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals? pp. 568-578

Eugenio Peluso and Alain Trannoy

Volume 132, issue 1, 2007

Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations pp. 1-26

Biung-Ghi Ju, Eiichi Miyagawa and Toyotaka Sakai

Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality pp. 27-46

Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Matthew O. Jackson

Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs pp. 47-69

Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm

Comparative cheap talk pp. 70-94

Archishman Chakraborty and Rick Harbaugh

On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects pp. 95-118

Sven de Vries, James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra

Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals pp. 119-136

Michael Landsberger

Invariance of conditional maximum utility pp. 137-146

André Jean-Louis de Palma and Karim Kilani

Multilateral bargaining with concession costs pp. 147-166

Guillermo Caruana, Liran Einav and Daniel Quint

Foundations of Bayesian theory pp. 167-188

Edi Karni

Exploitation and time pp. 189-207

Roberto Veneziani

Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods pp. 208-235

Szilvia Papai

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement pp. 236-273

Kfir Eliaz, Debraj Ray and Ronny Razin

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria pp. 274-290

Andreas Blume and Andreas Ortmann

Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory pp. 291-305

Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model pp. 306-334

Koichi Futagami and Tatsuro Iwaisako

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations pp. 335-366

Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes

Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation pp. 367-382

William H. Sandholm

Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations pp. 383-410

Alan Beggs

Demographic structure and capital accumulation pp. 411-434

d'Albis, Hippolyte

A nonsmooth, nonconvex model of optimal growth pp. 435-460

Takashi Kamihigashi and Santanu Roy

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games pp. 461-473

Drew Fudenberg and David Knudsen Levine

Filtral preorders and opportunity inequality pp. 474-492

Ernesto Savaglio and Stefano Vannucci

Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent pp. 493-506

Erzo G.J. Luttmer and Thomas Mariotti

On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions pp. 507-517

Matthew O. Jackson and Ilan Kremer

Nonstandard foundations of equilibrium search models pp. 518-529

Michael T. Rauh

The supercore for normal-form games pp. 530-538

Elena Inarra, M. Concepcion Larrea and Ana Isabel Saracho

The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism pp. 539-547

Aradhna Krishna and Yu Wang

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population pp. 548-556

Jonathan H. Hamilton and Steven Slutsky

Non-constant discounting in continuous time pp. 557-568

Larry S. Karp

Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification? pp. 569-583

Nicolas Gravel and Sylvie Thoron

Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players pp. 584-592

R. Vijay Krishna