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Journal of Economic Theory
1969 - 2013
Edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell
from Elsevier
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Volume 144, issue 6 , 2009
Introduction to dynamic general equilibrium pp. 2235-2246 Lee Edward Ohanian , Edward C. Prescott and Nancy L. Stokey Investment options and the business cycle pp. 2247-2265 Boyan Jovanovic Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example pp. 2266-2276 Edward Green Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes pp. 2277-2292 Richard Rogerson and Johanna Wallenius Business cycle fluctuations and the life cycle: How important is on-the-job skill accumulation? pp. 2293-2309 Gary D. Hansen and Selahattin Imrohoroglu What - or who - started the great depression? pp. 2310-2335 Lee Edward Ohanian Island matching pp. 2336-2353 Dale T. Mortensen Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique pp. 2354-2371 Drew Fudenberg and David Knudsen Levine On the robustness of laissez-faire pp. 2372-2387 Narayana Kocherlakota and Christopher Phelan Doubts or variability? pp. 2388-2418 Francisco Barillas , Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent Moving costs, nondurable consumption and portfolio choice pp. 2419-2439 Nancy L. Stokey Anonymity and individual risk pp. 2440-2453 Pamela Labadie Openness, technology capital, and development pp. 2454-2476 Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott Spatial growth and industry age pp. 2477-2502 Klaus Desmet and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg Volume 144, issue 5 , 2009
Understanding Markov-switching rational expectations models pp. 1849-1867 Roger E. A. Farmer , Daniel F. Waggoner and Tao Zha Do voters vote ideologically? pp. 1868-1894 Arianna Degan and Antonio Merlo The communication cost of selfishness pp. 1895-1920 Ronald Fadel and Ilya Segal Constrained school choice pp. 1921-1947 Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn Differentiability of the value function without interiority assumptions pp. 1948-1964 Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero and Manuel S. Santos Information acquisition and mutual funds pp. 1965-1995 Diego García and Joel M. Vanden Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation pp. 1996-2020 Huberto M. Ennis and Todd Keister Private polling in elections and voter welfare pp. 2021-2056 Dan Bernhardt , John Duggan and Francesco Squintani Efficient compromising pp. 2057-2076 Tilman Matthias Börgers and Peter Postl Hyperbolic discounting and the standard model: Eliciting discount functions pp. 2077-2083 Jawwad Noor A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity pp. 2084-2114 Subir Bose and Arup Daripa On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information pp. 2115-2145 Qingmin Liu Foundations of neo-Bayesian statistics pp. 2146-2173 Massimiliano Amarante Interpreted and generated signals pp. 2174-2196 Lu Hong and Scott Page The value of information for auctioneers pp. 2197-2208 Marcus Hagedorn Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? pp. 2209-2226 Onur Kesten Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] pp. 2227-2233 Bettina Klaus , Flip Klijn and Toshifumi Nakamura Volume 144, issue 4 , 2009
Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case pp. 1373-1395 Eugen Kovac and Tymofiy Mylovanov Mediation, arbitration and negotiation pp. 1397-1420 Maria Goltsman , Johannes Hörner , Gregory Pavlov and Francesco Squintani The wisdom of the minority pp. 1421-1439.e2 Steven Callander and Johannes Hörner Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies pp. 1440-1467 Brian W. Rogers , Thomas R. Palfrey and Colin F. Camerer On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy pp. 1468-1488 Bernardino Adao , Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions pp. 1489-1520 Quy-Toan Do and Andrei A. Levchenko Bubble-free policy feedback rules pp. 1521-1559 Olivier Loisel Endogenous inequality and fluctuations in a two-country model pp. 1560-1571 Tomoo Kikuchi and John Stachurski A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection pp. 1572-1588 Alberto Martin Pricing the ecosystem and taxing ecosystem services: A general equilibrium approach pp. 1589-1616 Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig Asymmetric first price auctions pp. 1617-1635 Rene Kirkegaard Merger negotiations and ex-post regret pp. 1636-1664 Dennis L. Gärtner and Armin Schmutzler Stable games and their dynamics pp. 1665-1693.e4 Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm Learning in games with unstable equilibria pp. 1694-1709 Michel Benaïm , Josef Hofbauer and Ed Hopkins Large population potential games pp. 1710-1725 William H. Sandholm Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria pp. 1726-1769 Daisuke Oyama and Olivier Tercieux Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making pp. 1770-1782 Nicolas Houy and Koichi Tadenuma The measurement of rank mobility pp. 1783-1803 D'Agostino, Marcello and Valentino Dardanoni A testable model of consumption with externalities pp. 1804-1816 Rahul Deb Bilateral commitment pp. 1817-1831 Sophie Bade , Guillaume Haeringer and Ludovic Renou Excess demand functions when new assets are introduced pp. 1832-1843 Takeshi Momi Volume 144, issue 3 , 2009
A theory of subjective compound lotteries pp. 899-929 Haluk Ergin and Faruk Gul Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences pp. 930-976 Peter Klibanoff , Massimo Marinacci and Sujoy Mukerji Information structures with unawareness pp. 977-993 Li Jing Apportioning of risks via stochastic dominance pp. 994-1003 Louis Eeckhoudt , Harris Schlesinger and Ilia Tsetlin Supermodularity and preferences pp. 1004-1014 Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique Subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice pp. 1015-1053 Youichiro Higashi , Kazuya Hyogo and Norio Takeoka Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity pp. 1054-1091 Klaus D. Nehring Greater downside risk aversion in the large pp. 1092-1101 Donald Keenan and Arthur Snow Parametric weighting functions pp. 1102-1118 Enrico Diecidue , Ulrich Schmidt and Horst Zank When is there state independence? pp. 1119-1134 Brian Hill Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence pp. 1135-1165 Masaki Aoyagi and Guillaume R. Frechette A theory of political cycles pp. 1166-1186 Leonardo Martinez Size approval voting pp. 1187-1210 Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Marc Vorsatz Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors pp. 1211-1226 Pablo Amoros Manipulation through political endorsements pp. 1227-1248 Mehmet Ekmekci A second chance at success: A political economy perspective pp. 1249-1277 Ryo Arawatari and Tetsuo Ono Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency pp. 1278-1299 Parimal Bag , Hamid Sabourian and Eyal Winter On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games pp. 1300-1319 Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design pp. 1320-1332 Paulo Barelli An existence result for discontinuous games pp. 1333-1340 Guilherme Carmona Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders pp. 1341-1351 Bernard Lebrun Reputation and exogenous private learning pp. 1352-1357 Thomas Wiseman A consistent multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle pp. 1358-1371 Kristof Bosmans , Luc Lauwers and Erwin Ooghe Volume 144, issue 2 , 2009
Directed search with multiple job applications pp. 445-471 Manolis Galenianos and Philipp Albert Theodor Kircher Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets pp. 473-501 Albert Marcet and Andrew Scott Sequential contracting with multiple principals pp. 503-531 Alessandro Pavan and Giacomo Calzolari Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets pp. 532-564 Nicolae Gârleanu Optimal collusion-proof auctions pp. 565-603 Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim Selecting equilibria in common agency games pp. 604-634 David MARTIMORT and Lars A Stole Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks pp. 635-675 Yuzhe Zhang Theories of coalitional rationality pp. 676-695 Attila Ambrus The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure pp. 696-721 Ben McQuillin Correlated Nash equilibrium pp. 722-743 Kin Chung Lo Pivots versus signals in elections pp. 744-771 Adam Meirowitz and Kenneth W. Shotts Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? pp. 772-801 Arnaud Dellis A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games pp. 802-824 Yuichi Yamamoto English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem pp. 825-849 Juan Dubra , Federico Echenique and Alejandro M. Manelli Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem pp. 851-868 Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan Decreasing impatience and the magnitude effect jointly contradict exponential discounting pp. 869-875 Jawwad Noor From posteriors to priors via cycles pp. 876-883 José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto The role of optimal threats in auction design pp. 884-897 Nicolas Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta Volume 144, issue 1 , 2009
Dynamic psychological games pp. 1-35 Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin Dufwenberg Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition pp. 36-68 Alex Gershkov and Balázs Szentes Mechanism design with collusive supervision pp. 69-95 Gorkem Celik Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects pp. 96-119 Herve Moulin Folk theorem with communication pp. 120-134 Ichiro Obara Afriat's theorem for general budget sets pp. 135-145 Francoise Forges and Enrico Minelli Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters pp. 146-174 Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation pp. 175-211 Philip Bond and Armando Gomes Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium pp. 212-247 Paul Milgrom and Bruno H. Strulovici Bayesian coalitional rationalizability pp. 248-263 Xiao Luo and Chih-Chun Yang Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation pp. 264-279 Benoit S Y Crutzen and Nicolas Sahuguet Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning pp. 280-295 Christos Koulovatianos , Leonard Jay Mirman and Marc Santugini Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria pp. 296-311 Gabriella Chiesa and Denicolo', Vincenzo Repeated games with one-memory pp. 312-336 Mehmet Barlo , Guilherme Carmona and Hamid Sabourian Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty pp. 337-353 Atsushi Kajii and Takashi Ui Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus pp. 354-374 Igor Kopylov An axiomatic theory of political representation pp. 375-389 Christopher P. Chambers The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle pp. 390-413 Laurent Lamy Global Newton Method for stochastic games pp. 414-421 Srihari Govindan and Robert Butler Wilson Structural holes in social networks: A remark pp. 422-431 Nicolas HOUY Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty pp. 432-443 Yeneng Sun and Yongchao Zhang
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