Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Helmut Bester and Roland Strausz ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 136, issue 1, pages 236-259

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication (2003)
Working Paper: Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:236-259

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