Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies

Hitoshi Matsushima

Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 141, issue 1, pages 134-151

Abstract: This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified.

Date: 2008

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Working Paper: Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:141:y:2008:i:1:p:134-151

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