Pivots versus signals in elections

Adam Meirowitz and Kenneth W. Shotts

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 2, pages 744-771

Abstract: We consider a two-period model of elections in which voters have private information about their policy preferences. A first-period vote can have two types of consequences: it may be pivotal in the first election and it provides a signal that affects candidates' positions in the second election. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the effect of a single vote is enormous. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling effect, but the effect of a single vote is small. We investigate which effect - pivot or signaling - drives equilibrium voting behavior in large electorates.

Keywords: Elections; Information; Pivot; Signaling; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:744-771

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