A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games

Yuichi Yamamoto

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 2, pages 802-824

Abstract: The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Hörner, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this result, a version of the folk theorem is established for N-player prisoner's dilemma games.

Keywords: Repeated; game; Private; monitoring; Almost-perfect; monitoring; Belief-free; equilibrium; Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:802-824

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