English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Juan Dubra (), Federico Echenique () and Alejandro M. Manelli

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 2, pages 825-849

Abstract: We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Keywords: Auction; theory; International; trade; Monotone; comparative; statics; Global; univalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:825-849

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