Size approval voting

Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge and Marc Vorsatz ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 3, pages 1187-1210

Abstract: We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting procedures is characterized by a set of natural properties.

Keywords: Approval; voting; Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: Size Approval Voting (2007)
Working Paper: Size Approval Voting (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1187-1210

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