Reputation and exogenous private learning

Thomas Wiseman

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 3, pages 1352-1357

Abstract: Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff.

Keywords: Reputation; Chain; store; game; Learning; Noisy; signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1352-1357

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