Stable games and their dynamics

Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 144, issue 4, pages 1665-1693.e4

Abstract: We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. We prove that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. Convergence results for stable games are not as general as those for potential games: in addition to monotonicity of the dynamics, integrability of the agents' revision protocols plays a key role.

Keywords: Population; games; Evolutionarily; stable; strategies; Evolutionary; dynamics; Global; stability; Lyapunov; functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1665-1693.e4

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