Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
Willemien Kets ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 1, pages 300-325
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris (1998)  when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.
Keywords: Incomplete; information; Higher-order; beliefs; Robustness; Strategic; proximity; Local; interactions; Anonymous; games; Heterogeneous; externalities; Network; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:300-325
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