A limit theorem for systems of social interactions

Ulrich Horst and Jose Alexandre Scheinkman ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, vol. 45, issue 9-10, pages 609-623

Abstract: In this paper, we establish a convergence result for equilibria in systems of social interactions with many locally and globally interacting players. Assuming spacial homogeneity and that interactions between different agents are not too strong, we show that equilibria of systems with finitely many players converge to the unique equilibrium of a benchmark system with infinitely many agents. We prove convergence of individual actions and of average behavior. Our results also apply to a class of interaction games.

Keywords: Convergence; of; equilibria; Global; interactions; Local; interactions; Random; interaction; structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: A Limit Theorem for Systems of Social Interactions (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:609-623

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