Note on the equal split solution in an n-person noncooperative bargaining game

Toshiji Miyakawa

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 55, issue 3, pages 281-291

Abstract: This note examines a noncooperative bargaining game model to implement the "equal split" solution in a transferable utility coalitional form game provided by Hart and Mas-Colell [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 1996. Bargaining and value. Econometrica 64, 357-380]. We first clarify the relationship between the equal split solution and the Nash bargaining solution in a coalitional form game and extend the model to a nontransferable utility coalitional form game. We then provide a sufficient condition for generating the Nash bargaining solution payoff configuration and the equal split solution as the limit of the stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs of Hart and Mas-Colell's bargaining game when the probabilities of the breakdown of negotiations converge to zero.

Date: 2008
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