Politically credible social insurance

Christopher Sleet and Sevin Yeltekin

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, vol. 55, issue 1, pages 129-151

Abstract: This paper considers the political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedi ... 5feb2568a725516e07f1
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Monetary Economics is edited by R. G. King and C. I. Plosser

More articles in Journal of Monetary Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal ().