Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems

David C. Mills () and Travis Dean Nesmith ()

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, vol. 55, issue 3, pages 542-553

Abstract: What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserve's Fedwire funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participant's decision on when to send transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts, central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks.

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Working Paper: Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems (2007)
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