Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants

Donato Masciandaro, Marc G. Quintyn and Michael William Taylor

European Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 24, issue 4, pages 833-848

Abstract: This paper analyzes recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance inside and outside central banks. We first review the case for supervisory independence and accountability in order to frame the econometric work on their determinants. We then calculate the levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries, disentangling similarities and differences among central banks and pure financial supervisors. The empirical analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood for establishing governance arrangements suitable for supervision is higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.

Keywords: Financial; supervision; Central; banking; Independence; Accountability; Political; economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:833-848

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