Financial market lobbies and pension reform

Achim Kemmerling and Michael Neugart ()

European Journal of Political Economy, 2009, vol. 25, issue 2, pages 163-173

Abstract: We develop a model in which firms in the financial market lobby the government to lower compulsory contributions to the public pension system. Firms lobby in order to increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. We conclude with a comparison of two major pension reforms in Europe exemplifying the influence of financial market lobbies on pension policies.

Keywords: Pension; reform; Political; economy; of; pension; systems; Lobbying; Financial; market; Institutional; investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:25:y:2009:i:2:p:163-173

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