Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities

Sergio Currarini () and Francesco Feri

Research in Economics, 2006, vol. 60, issue 2, pages 112-119

Date: 2006

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Working Paper: Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities (2006)
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