Why are researchers paid bonuses? On technology spillovers and market rivalry
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego d'Andria ()
Research Policy, 2016, vol. 45, issue 10, 2105-2112
A temporary change in pay to employed inventors around the time of patent application has been documented. A theoretical model is here developed to provide an explanation to said findings based on the idea that inventors may be able to use the knowledge previously generated while working in a firm, in a rival company. The model features firms who hire workers in R&D functions to make product innovations. The innovation process consists of distinct phases each with different access to information about the innovation value for firms. Firms compete to attract workers, and workers can transfer part of the generated new knowledge to a new employer. Results suggest that the capital intensity of R&D investments, and the type and size of knowledge spillovers, may affect the probability to observe bonus pay at the time of a patent application.
Keywords: Innovation; Policy; Employed inventors; Tax incentives for R&D; Subsidies for R&D; Bonus pay; Labor mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 J6 D21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:45:y:2016:i:10:p:2105-2112
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