Followers and leaders: Reciprocity, social norms and group behavior

Raúl López-Pérez

The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2009, vol. 38, issue 4, pages 557-567

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of norm-driven preferences and studies the determinants of norm compliance in games. It predicts that (i) compliance follows a law of demand and (ii) people respect norms in a reciprocal manner: they are more likely to comply if others are expected to comply too. Reciprocal norm compliance might explain why successful revolutions or strikes grow in a snow-balled fashion, leaders motivate others to join social movements, or sequential mechanisms (instead of simultaneous ones) are usually employed in charity fundraising.

Keywords: Followers; Heterogeneity; Leaders; Reciprocity; Social; norms; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:557-567

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