A simple theory of [`]meso'. On the co-evolution of institutions and platform size--With an application to varieties of capitalism and [`]medium-sized' countries
Abstract:
This paper deals with institutional emergence in the well-known [`]evolution of cooperation' framework and focuses on its size dimension. It is argued that some [`]meso' (rather than [`]macro') level (to be numerically determined) is the proper level of cultural emergence, diffusion, and retention. Also Schumpeterian economists (K. Dopfer et al.) have discussed institutions as [`]meso' phenomena, and Schelling, Axelrod, Arthur, Lindgren, and many others have dealt with [`]critical masses' of coordinated agents, including related segregations of populations. However, the process and logic of emergent group size has rarely been explicitly explored so far. In this paper, [`]meso' will be explained, in an evolutionary and game-theoretic frame and a population perspective, in terms of a cooperating group smaller than the whole population involved. Mechanisms such as memory, monitoring, reputation chains, and active partner selection will loosen the total connectivity of the deterministic [`]single-shot' benchmark and thus allow for emergent [`]meso'-sized arenas, while expectations to meet a cooperative partner next round remain sufficiently high. Applications of [`]meso-nomia' include the deep structure of [`]general trust' and the surprisingly high macro-economic and macro-social performance in [`]small' and [`]well-networked' countries which helps to explain persistent [`]varieties of capitalism'. A strategy for empirical application of the theoretical approach and some first empirical indications of its relevance are presented.