The Moral Worth of Creatures: Neo-Classical Metaphysics and the Value Theories of Rolston and Callicott

Francisco Benzoni

Environmental Values, 2009, vol. 18, issue 1, pages 5-32

Abstract: After showing that Rolston's and Callicott's value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality (from non-sensuous, non-conscious to self-conscious) are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott's legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston's legitimate demand that intrinsic value not depend upon human valuation.

Keywords: Environmental ethics; moral worth; intrinsic value; metaphysics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D46 Q51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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