Will Cooperators Manage to Cooperate? - Experimental Evidence

Max Albert (), Erich Kirchler, Werner Güth () and Boris Maciejovsky
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Erich Kirchler: University of Vienna, Department of Psychology, Unit of Economic Psychology, Vienna, Austria
Boris Maciejovsky: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Jena, Germany

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, pages 377-399

Abstract: It is often claimed that, if one could sense whether the other is going to cooperate or not, cooperators will manage to cooperate. Our experiment tries to shed new light on this debate. Participants could make their strategies in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game and a trust game dependent on their partners' individual donation shares to a self-selected charity and on whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations (group affiliation). On average, a high donation share triggered a noncooperative response more often. This result was, however, observable only in the trust game. Participants were found not to condition their choices on group affiliation.

Date: 2001

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:377-399

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