The Coordinated Solution for Superadditive Games with Empty Core

Dimitar Antov () and Edward Packel ()
Additional contact information
Dimitar Antov: Economics Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA,
Edward Packel: Mathematics Department, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, USA

Homo Oeconomicus, 2004, vol. 20, pages 449-460

Abstract: An explicit “empty core” condition is presented for superadditive games. This condition is then used to support an imputation for such games that we call the coordinated solution, that results from restricting bargaining to coalitions of size and . An assumption that a size coalition must form leads to an alternative version of the coordinated solution. In addition to several specific examples, some general theorems about how the coordinated solution relates to established solution concepts are presented.

Date: 2004

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:20:y:2004:p:449-460

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Homo Oeconomicus from Institute of SocioEconomics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Matthew Braham (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .