Global Monotonicity of Values of Cooperative Games: An Argument Supporting the Explanatory Power of Shapley’s Approach

René Levínský () and Peter Silársky

Homo Oeconomicus, 2004, vol. 20, pages 473-492

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:20:y:2004:p:473-492

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Homo Oeconomicus from Institute of SocioEconomics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Matthew Braham (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .