Fiscal Choices and Religion in Ottoman Europe

Eliana Balla ()
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Eliana Balla: Department of Economics, Washington University, St. Louis, USA

Homo Oeconomicus, 2004, vol. 21, pages 59-82

Abstract: While during the Early Modern Age, Christian Europe was torn by religious discord, the Ottoman Empire was a state which was largely liberal with respect to the religion of its subjects. The explanation given in this essay is that non-Muslims were a cornerstone to financing the Empire’s warfare and bureaucratic apparatus as they paid for their right to practice Christianity or Judaism by accepting higher taxation. Discriminatory taxation, combined with a number of benefits from accepting the faith of the new rulers, provided a system of incentives to convert among the Ottoman European subjects. The Ottoman rulers were thus constrained: a higher tax differential for non-Muslims induced more voluntary conversions to Islam, reducing the empire’s tax base. The Ottomans utilised institutional mechanisms, such as the preservation of a strong Christian Church, to discourage conversion.

Date: 2004

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:59-82

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