The Evolution of the German Tort Law in the Nineteenth Century: an Economic Analysis of the Evolution of Law

Martina Eckardt ()

Homo Oeconomicus, 2004, vol. 21, pages 83-116

Abstract: This essay combines the main ideas of neo-institutionalism with those of Evolutionary Economics in order to construct a model of the process of legal evolution. The cognitive creativity of the actors on the one hand, and wealth effects caused by negative technological externalities - resulting from the use of new technologies - on the other hand, are interpreted as the decisive factors that explain legal change. The fruitfulness of this approach is shown by its application to the development of tort law in nineteenth-century Germany. There, a trial-and-error-process of legal innovations and imitations was triggered, resulting in the present-day broad diffusion of the strict liability rule in German tort law.

Date: 2004

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:83-116

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