PREFERENCES, CHOICES AND SATISFACTION IN A BARGAINING GAMEAngela Ambrosino, Alessandro Lanteri () and Marco Novarese () The Icfai Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, vol. III, issue 3, pages 7-21 Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the role of cheap talk in the determination of the focal point in a bargaining game. A general discussion was conducted before the bargaining, followed by a poll in which the players had to find a common solution to an abstract bargaining problem. Though the results were negative, it is concluded that knowing individual preferences may help in predicting the solutions—towards which players will converge at least in a social setting—and ‘understanding’ the extent of satisfaction. These considerations refer to variables traditionally left out of economic analysis—which focuses instead on the final payoff and not on their relation to preferences or satisfaction—that are deemed non-measurable. On the contrary, this work shows that consistent data emerge by simply asking players to express their preferences and satisfaction. This gives the authors the confidence to formulate new hypotheses aiming at uncovering and understanding individual behavior. Even if the results do not permit to draw strong final conclusions, they point out new possible answers, new ideas and topics for discussion. There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Access Statistics for this article More articles in The Icfai Journal of Industrial Economics from Icfai Press |
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