A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption

Dritan Osmani () and Richard S.J. Tol ()

The IUP Journal of Journal of Managerial Economics, 2008, vol. VI, issue 3, pages 22-39

Abstract: Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximizes their joint welfare. In this paper, the joint maximization assumption is compared to different welfare sharing schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and consensus value. The results show that the joint welfare maximization assumption is similar to the Nash bargaining solution.

Date: 2008

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Working Paper: A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icf:icfjme:v:06:y:2008:i:3:p:22-39

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