Bankruptcy, Warranties and the Firm's Capital Structure

Elie Appelbaum

International Economic Review, 1992, vol. 33, issue 2, pages 399-412

Abstract: This paper examines the role of capital structure as an instrument for shifting risk between real and financial markets. The author considers a firm whose contractual agreements involve both consumers and debtholders and shows that if consumers are risk averse, whereas equity and debtholders are risk neutral, the firm uses its capital structure to shift risk away from consumers. The optimal allocation of risk across real and financial markets leads the firm to be fully equity financed. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 1992
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%2819920 ... O%3B2-A&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
Working Paper: BANKRUPTCY, WARRANTIES AND THE FIRM'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE (1989)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:33:y:1992:i:2:p:399-412

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is edited by Kenneth I. Wolpin

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
Address: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().