POPULATION POLICY THROUGH TRADABLE PROCREATION ENTITLEMENTS

David de la Croix () and Axel Gosseries

International Economic Review, 2009, vol. 50, issue 2, pages 507-542

Abstract: One of the first tradable rights proposal is Boulding's ("The Meaning of the Twentieth Century", London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1964), dealing with overpopulation. We discuss both tradable procreation allowances and exemptions domestically and globally, to address underpopulation as well. We focus on three effects. Notably, the rights' tradability entails that whereas exemptions or expensive enough allowances benefit the poor, cheap allowances benefit the rich. A natalist policy also worsens the average education level of the next generation, whereas population control enhances it. Also, if procreation rights are grandfathered to countries, the scheme redistributes further. Our analysis suggests that procreation entitlements may be efficient in controlling population, without being necessarily anti-redistributive. Copyright © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Date: 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: Population Policy through Tradable Procreation Entitlements (2007)
Working Paper: Population Policy through Tradable Procreation Entitlements (2006)
Working Paper: Population policy through tradable procreation entitlements (2006)
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