The Integration of Defectors in a Cooperative Setting

Marie-Edith Bissey () and Guido Ortona ()

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2002, vol. 5

Abstract: This paper describes a study of the robustness of cooperative conventions. We observe the effect of the invasion of non-cooperating subjects into a community adopting a cooperative convention. The convention is described by an indefinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game. We check the effects on the robustness of the cooperating convention of two characteristics of the game, namely the size of the prisonner-dilemma groups and the "intelligence" of the players. The relevance for real-world problems is considered. We find that the "intelligence" of the players plays a crucial role in the way players learn to cooperate. The simulation program is written in SWARM (Java version).

Keywords: Cooperation; Conventions; Prisoner's Dilemma; Social Simulation; SWARM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-31

Downloads: (external link)
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/2/2.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2001-26-2

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation from Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Series data maintained by ().