Abstract:
This article explores office market system dynamics through a simple simulation model. Model lag and adjustment parameters similar to real office markets generate explosive cycles. Simulations show that deviations from equilibrium can be reduced by changing the information structure of the system. System dynamics, principle/agent conflicts, a prisoners’ dilemma game, faulty information (poor forecasting, market research and valuation techniques), regulatory institutions, and differing equilibria in office space and financial markets all contribute to allocative inefficiency. Thinking of office markets as a "managed feedback control system" may be a useful representation of the oversupply problem. Leverage points for system improvement may be a municipal "queue" to address agency and prisoner's dilemma problems, improved forecasting techniques and more reliance on forecasting.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323 http://aux.zicklin.b ... u/jrer/about/get.htm
Journal of Real Estate Research is edited by Dr. Ko Wang
More articles in Journal of Real Estate Research from American Real Estate Society Address: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323 Series data maintained by JRER Graduate Assistant/Webmaster ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .