Restructuring Agency Relationships in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: An Economic Analysis
Thomas Miceli (),
Katherine A. Pancak () and
C. F. Sirmans ()
Additional contact information Katherine A. Pancak: University of Connecticut Storrs, CT 06269, http://www.uconn.edu/ C. F. Sirmans: University of Connecticut Storrs, CT 06269, http://www.uconn.edu/
Abstract:
Recent state legislative reforms of real estate agency relationships suggest that traditional agency law and practice are not meeting the needs of the parties involved in a residential real estate purchase and sales transaction. In this article, we argue that this is due, at least in part, to the bundling of information and representation services provided by brokers. This bundling results in a tradeoff between the benefits of buyers and sellers in sharing information prior to a match, and the cost to the parties individually of revealing information during bargaining. We conclude that, from an economic perspective, effective agency reform must solve this basic conflict, perhaps by unbundling the matching and representation functions.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323 http://aux.zicklin.b ... u/jrer/about/get.htm
Journal of Real Estate Research is edited by Dr. Ko Wang
More articles in Journal of Real Estate Research from American Real Estate Society Address: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323 Series data maintained by JRER Graduate Assistant/Webmaster ().
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