Homeowners? Repeat-Sale Gains, Dual Agency and Repeated Use of the Same Agent
Richard D. Evans () and
Phillip T. Kolbe ()
Additional contact information Richard D. Evans: Fogelman College of Business and Economics, University of Memphis, Memphis TN 38152
Phillip T. Kolbe: Fogelman College of Business and Economics, University of Memphis, Memphis TN 38152
Abstract:
Previous studies of dual agency, where one agent serves both buyer and seller in a transaction, use hedonic models. Repeat-sale methods can test for the price effect of accepting dual agency. Dual agency does not show convincing effects on expected gain, which would occur if there was a systematic bias, or on heteroscedasticity, which would occur if there are large effects that are rare. Earlier researchers could not test for the effect of an owner picking a listing agent who was the earlier selling agent. Consistently positive mean abnormal price gains come from this choice, as well as signi?cant heteroscedasticity.
JEL-codes:L85 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2005
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323 http://aux.zicklin.b ... u/jrer/about/get.htm
Journal of Real Estate Research is edited by Dr. Ko Wang
More articles in Journal of Real Estate Research from American Real Estate Society Address: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323 Series data maintained by JRER Graduate Assistant/Webmaster ().
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