Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms on Motives for Participating in Sale-Leaseback Agreements
Fayez A. Elayan,
Thomas O. Meyer () and
Jingyu Li Additional contact information Fayez A. Elayan: Dept. of Accounting, Brock University
Thomas O. Meyer: Dept. of Marketing & Finance, Southeastern Louisiana University, SLU 10844, Hammond, LA 70402
Jingyu Li: Dept. of Accounting, Brock University
Abstract:
Previous research finds evidence that tax factors motivate the participants in leasing transactions. Tax-arbitrage arguments predict that leasing participants gain when the lessor’s tax rate exceeds that of the lessee. The research employs a sample of effectively tax-exempt REIT lessors to explore alternative leasing motives. Changes in REIT qualification rules are examined to develop an Agency-Cost, and competing Income-Retention Hypothesis for lessors. The rules and changes suggest that REIT management has the incentive, motive and opportunity to make real-estate investments quickly. The evidence developed is consistent with agency-costs arising from the possibility that they may overpay for properties.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323 http://aux.zicklin.b ... u/jrer/about/get.htm
Journal of Real Estate Research is edited by Dr. Ko Wang
More articles in Journal of Real Estate Research from American Real Estate Society Address: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323 Series data maintained by JRER Graduate Assistant/Webmaster ().
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