Cities and Professional Sports Teams: A Dynamic Bargaining Model

Jeffrey Owen and William J. Polley ()
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Jeffrey Owen: Gustavus Adolphus College

International Journal of Sport Finance, 2007, vol. 2, issue 2, pages 64-78

Abstract: We investigate the phenomenon in which professional sports teams receive subsidies from cities to induce them to remain in the city. These subsidies often take the form of public funding for a new stadium. Using a dynamic model of bargaining with asymmetric threat points, we show that teams can extract increasing concessions from the city, culminating with the partial public funding of a new stadium. The model is consistent with many observed city/team bargaining relationships where lease renegotiations often favor the team over the city as teams use the threat of relocation as leverage in negotiations.

Keywords: stadiums; subsidies; Nash bargaining; dynamic programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

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