The Underpayment of Restricted Players in North American Sports Leagues

Anthony Krautmann (), Peter von Allmen () and David Berri ()
Additional contact information
Anthony Krautmann: DePaul University
Peter von Allmen: Moravian College
David Berri: Southern Utah University

International Journal of Sport Finance, 2009, vol. 4, issue 3, pages 161-175

Abstract: In this paper,we consider whether underpaying players restricted by the reserve clause is a common practice in the three largest sports leagues in North America—the NFL, NBA, and MLB. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that owners of professional sports teams do exercise monopsony power whenever and wherever they can. Although differences exist across the three sports, our results indicate that in general: restricted players are underpaid; when the negotiating power of players rises, owners are less able to extract a surplus; and, the greatest surplus tends to be extracted from those who create the greatest amount of value.

Keywords: underpayment; reserve clause; surplus; free agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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