Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective

Peter J. Boettke (), Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, vol. 18, issue 2, pages 127-143

Abstract: The economic approach to politics revolutionized the way scholars in economics and political science approached the study of political decision-making by introducing the possibility of government failure. However, the persistent and consistent application of neoclassical models of economics also seemed to suggest that once the full costs were accounted for, this failure was an illusion. This paper counters these arguments, typically associated with George Stigler, Gary Becker and Donald Wittman, by focusing on the underlying economic theory. We develop an alternative model of political economy grounded in the Austrian conception of the dynamic market process. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Government failure; Market failure; Market process; Public choice; B52; B53; H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:127-143

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