Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?

Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()

Economic Change and Restructuring, 2004, vol. 31, issue 2, pages 281-294

Abstract: In a monetary union, macroeconomic policies are strongly associated with externalities that imply the need for coordination. However, if coordination is not complete, it might be unable to cope with the externalities. This paper investigates different solutions for internalizing policy externalities. In particular, we compare wage coordination to the conservative central banker solution, which the recent literature has found able to impose wage moderation on labor unions. We also discuss some issues related to labor flexibility reforms as a solution for the unemployment problem. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: Conservative central bank; budget constraints; wage coordination; monetary union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Working Paper: Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination? (2003)
Journal Article: Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination? (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:31:y:2004:i:2:p:281-294

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