On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis

Ulrich Blum (), Nicole Steinat () and Michael Veltins ()

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2008, vol. 25, issue 3, pages 209-229

Keywords: Cartel; Leniency; Cement industry; Games; Chief witness; Bonus regulation; Germany; K2; K21; K42; L1; L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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