The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain

Jan Schnellenbach ()

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2004, vol. 17, issue 1, pages 97-115

Keywords: positive constitutional economics; collective learning; path-dependent rule-evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:17:y:2004:i:1:p:97-115

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