Efficient compensation for employees' inventions

Roland Kirstein and Birgit Will ()

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2006, vol. 21, issue 2, pages 129-148

Keywords: Moral hazard; Hold-up; Efficient fixed wage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions (2003)
Working Paper: Efficient Compensation for Employees’ Inventions
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:21:y:2006:i:2:p:129-148

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